
Recently, the french air media, avons légendaires, revealed that negotiations between iraq and france for the procurement of the 14 f4 jets are in their final stages. The total amount of the transaction amounted to **30-32 billion dollars** and consisted of 10 single-seat c and 4 double-seat b, all newly manufactured in the french bordeaux production line. Iraq has paid a down payment of **240 million dollars,** the balance of which is to be offset by the physical supply of oil. (blockview://markdown-image-tos-cn-i-t/30f9074ce41a463eb5fb7421f6b4ba8a) this news is a matter of immediate concern, as iraq has repeatedly, since 2021, expressed its “strong interest” in china's 10ce and china's “colonel” block 3 aircraft. In 2023, pakistani officials confirmed their interest in the chinese-palestinian warships. On the one hand, the contacts that have been going on for many years, and on the other hand, the contracts that are about to land, iraq's “transaction” is not simply a waiver, but a sophisticated multiparty game. # iraq's face and leeko project appears to have never given up on this card in its negotiations with france. Defence analysts pointed out that iraq's access to chinese warplanes was more of a chip to lower the french offer**. Iraq's finances are not generous, the wind is running at over $100 million per unit in the international market, and direct negotiations are bound to be priced. In order to force france to offer more favourable conditions, china has taken china’s 10-ce (which is known for its value). From reiko's perspective, however, iraq's real need is to construct an air defence system** independent of united states control**. Its current air force is dominated by a downgraded version of f-16iq provided by the united states, which is politically bound by washington. The french programme includes not only 14 warplanes, but also a series of radars by the “masters of the ground” of thérez, 12 h225m helicopters and assistance in establishing a central air area control command system. The complete system output allowed iraq's air defence radar capacity to integrate with the wind fighter jets and truly to move away from reliance on a single supplier. # french card: oil payments and low down payment of france's key card in this game are unprecedented** flexible payment options**. Iraq was allowed to offset most of the purchase payments with crude oil supplies and to commence contracts with a down payment of only $240 million at a total price of over $3 billion. This model perfects iraq's economic structure, which is dependent on oil exports, and is a new paradigm for france's resource-driven national defence market. By contrast, while china's high value for money and over-the-horizon air warfare capability has been validated in practice (accomplished in the indian-palestinian air war of 2025), the compatibility of the system** is not consistent with the current situation in iraq. Iraq's existing logistics maintenance, ammunition supply and pilot training models are based on western standards, and the introduction of chinese warplanes on a scale means overturning the entire safeguards system, which is politically, economically and technically painful. # situational direction: where are the key variables? As of june 2026, the contract between france and iraq had not yet been formally signed and is expected to be completed in the second half of 2026**. The next step of the deal is to see two variables at the core. ** first, could france ensure that the capacity of large customers, such as india, who have already placed orders is not affected before the contract is signed? The first 80 winds f4, currently produced by france for the united arab emirates, are not expected to be delivered until the end of 2026. ** second, the choice of iraq reveals the general trend in defence procurement among middle eastern countries:** the pursuit of pluralism and greater autonomy**. Qatar and the uae have long been involved in bulk procurement; egypt and indonesia have also sought a balance between chinese and american law. If successful, iraq's oil payment model could become a model for other resource-type countries, opening up wider markets for france. The final outcome of this game is not whether iraq abandons the chinese warplanes, but whether it will ultimately achieve its long-term goal of freeing itself from third-party control and establishing independent air defence through the french card. The next key battlefield is not the negotiating table in baghdad, but the production line in bordeaux and the oil settlement contract in paris。




