In july 1933, the nanjing national government issued an extremely rare list of awards, awarding 49 medals。
This was the largest and most intensive award since its establishment in 1929, in the context of the great wall's recent end of fighting。
The list covers all levels, from the general to the chief of staff, and is known on the list of 17th military commander xu tun-joo, 2nd division commander huang jieh, 25th division commander and 83rd division chief liu。
But behind this luminous piece of honor, there is an extremely bright void: as a de facto commander of the great wall's anti-gurbian junction and deputy division of the 25th division, doo-min disappeared completely from the list。
This omission gave rise to much private debate in the military circles at the time。
With regard to seniority, doo-ming was a student of huang po and a student of heaven; with regard to the position, he was second in command of the 25th division, acting as commander of the worst part of the security war in gubei province, when he was seriously wounded at the beginning of the war。
The 25th division's killing on the front line of the wall was a well-known hard bone, and even considered by the japanese army to be the best in china。
But it was the one with the big bag that ended up without even a consolation prize, and even xu tsai, who was later withdrawn from the european expedition, left behind only doo-ming。
Many have customarily attributed this to factionalism or exclusion。
The most widely reported claim is that there was a discrepancy between the customs parade and doo-ming's character, and that chief guan had put his shoes on doo-ming in the war papers。
This logic cannot afford a minimum。
The borderlines and doo-ming are the same and have a deep secret heritage。
In 1924, doo-ming went to guangzhou with 11 shao-xi villages, including the customs parade, and was late。
Finally, du jiato had found a member of the national party in the right-hand position, and the right-hand position had been the reason for the offer of a supplementary examination。
It's a life-saving thing to do。
In 1932, during ho quiu, the forces of the conquests were surrounded by the red army and were seen to be completely destroyed. It was the soldiers of doo-ming who came to the siege to save the old men of the conquests。
An old man who saved your life and took you on the road, even if they were in dispute over tactical understanding, it would never have been possible to openly trip the prize。
This destroys not only doo-ming, but also the credibility of guan guang in the army and the huang po circle。
Since there was patron (right) on the upper floor, there was life and death on the lower floor (close) and doo-ming's medal had been lost for reasons only in his own hands and in those two deadly command decisions。
The chaos of the war in the north is essentially a tragic defeat in the transition of the chinese army from an old warlord to a modern defensive position。
The wall was guarded by two completely different forces: the central army of chiang kai-shek and the north-east army left behind by zhang xu liang。
The game between the two sides began at the first second of the positions。
On 10 march, as soon as the 25th division arrived on the front line, doo-min saw a farce that had left him to pieces。
The northeast army, wang ichul and zhang jin-chung, are arguing at the headquarters at the northern junction
Wang ezil wanted the 25th division of the newly arrived central army to rise directly, while the closure insisted on taking up only second-line positions and leaving the first line to the already exhausted 112th division of the north-east army。
At this point, doo-ming made a proposal that, in his view, was extremely just: half of the strength of the 25th and 112th divisions would be combined。
This programme is a disaster at the tactical level。
The chain of command will break in an instant once the japanese forces attack and combine two formed, communication and even dialectic forces。
The name of the northeast army is not zhang zheng zhuenthu, and he saw that behind this sharing was an attempt to consume the remaining capital of the northeast army。
As a result, zhang zheng zheng zhui left the wall with only one regiment, after having left the main force in a clean and clean manner。
As soon as the 2nd day japanese army attacked, the regiment was crushed and the entire north exit flank was exposed directly to japanese artillery fire。
The men were seriously injured by a grenade while carrying the reinforcements themselves, and the blood was carried down。
It was in this state of extreme chaos and collapse of trust that doo-ming took over the command stick of the 25th division。
Subsequently, doo min committed the mistake of being the first in his military career to be characterized as amateur after the war。
The defence posture of the 25th division was already isolated, and the best way to do so would be to reduce its strength and establish a deep defence, with the town of the northern junction at its core, awaiting reinforcement from the second division in the rear。
Doo ming, however, was caught up in a deep fear of losing his position。
In an attempt to fill the left-wing vacuum left by the north-east army, he ordered the strength of the 25th division, which was already overstretched, to be forced to stretch its strength and spread its bread-cake defence over several kilometres of mountains。
The most feared defence is more breakthroughs。
Instead of chewing on his weak wing, the japanese forces concentrated all armoured vehicles and heavy artillery on the middle of the 25th division line and on the most emptied part of the force。
On 12 march 1933, at noon, the japanese army struck the line from the centre of the line in less than two hours, killing directly to the entrance of the division in the town of kubei。
Such a heart-breaking black tiger has made doo-ming's troops deployed in both wings an island, cutting off the way back and only spreading in the mountains。
If the first account was an error in decision-making, the second account was a pure collapse of resilience。
In the course of the withdrawal, dow ming received information that the 145th regiment in front had been heavily intercepted by japanese forces。
He was so anxious that he even sent his scouts to confirm the size of the enemy that he was forced to remove the main forces from the original chain of retreats in a chaotic middle road。
A comparison of the japanese military files (e. G., the 32nd infantry unit history) revealed that the 145th regiment was stopped not by any major coalition but by hundreds of japanese cavalry units。
It is unforgivable in chiang kai-shek's eyes that hundreds of cavalrymen have mobilized the main force of the chinese elite。
In chiang's war logic, you can defeat the war, but you can't be played like a monkey by your opponent。
These two miscalculations by doo ming directly led to the evacuation of the 25th division at the northern entrance of guangya at the cost of over 4,000 casualties。
The proportion of casualties is extremely high in the great wall。
It can be said that not only did doo-ming fail to recover the decline, but instead, because of his uncertainty, he turned an orderly withdrawal into a tragic escape。
This hesitating syndrome of enemy judgement seems to be the background that doo-ming will never escape。
We can cross-reference his subsequent key choices。
In 1939, while the 5th army was famous in the kümlund battle, at the beginning of the war doo-ming also committed serious hostile miscalculation。
He mistook the position of the japanese army's most heavily guarded main of the nine tongs as a forwarding position, which led the attacking forces to crash into a heavy japanese machine-gun fire network in an unprotected area。
This error resulted in the 5th army, the only mechanized army in china, having worked exceptionally hard during the offensive, at the expense of a large number of good grass-roots technical cadres。
The most stifling was the defeat of the wild mountain in 1942。
Once again, when it became clear that raqu had been cut off by the japanese army, doo-ming was plunged into some near-biased fear。
He was convinced that it was the 56th division of the japanese army that blocked his return, and even took tens of thousands of people into the pristine forest despite the original orders of stever and chiang。
According to the japanese operational logs, which were subsequently declassified, it was only a quick-search column of the japanese army that was occupying raqqah at the time, with a total of 1,000 persons。
If doo-ming had dared to give up his fight, with the weight of fire and the size of the remnants of the 5th army at the time, it would have been perfectly possible to return home from the front of luang without causing tens of thousands of soldiers to die in the air of the mountain of the wild。
From the ancient north entrance of 1933 to the wilder hills of 1942 and to the waihai battlefield of 1948, the command logic of doo-min demonstrates a high degree of consistency: he is able to demonstrate a high degree of tactical literacy and implementation when the situation is smooth, with clear commands from his superiors and adequate supplies。
But once in the back wind, when he is needed as the highest decision-maker to independently judge the real and false information, his brain is accustomed to conservative and suspicious extremes。
This character may be a good bureaucrat in peacetime, but in the battle of bayonets, it is fatal。
Return to the rules for the selection of the 49 medals。
The national government has a strict land, sea and air force regulations for the award of the order。
Two of the core elements are, first, the proper handling of the battle, which makes the whole army or one of the most important victors; and, secondly, the resilience of the struggle when it comes to hardship。
The performance of doo-ming at the north mouth of the country is clearly a precise reverse of both rules。
Instead of being properly dealt with, he caused the defence avalanche because of the pie; he was unable to recover the decline, but instead brought the war to deeper chaos。
By contrast, the 2nd division, also on the battlefield at the gubei junction, was able to quickly close the remaining pieces after the collapse of the line of defence, conducting a stairblock at the southern gate position, and the hard-wire stood up to the japanese army's subsequent attack for more than a month。
That's what used to be the way it was。
So wong received the medal, and doo-min left a controversial post-war report in the file。
The report, which was kept for a long period of time in the confidential files of the military commission of the national government, contains detailed records of the staff officers ' questioning of the change of command in doo-min during those hours。
This embarrassment, which has been forgotten by the order, has had a profound impact on doo-min。
It shapes the spirit that was followed by doo-ming's keen desire to make up for his short-span through listening and loyalty。
In his subsequent military career, he became almost the most determined implementer of the chiang kai-shek strategy, even if it was intended to be militaryly absurd。
This mentality reached its peak in the battleground of the sea in 1948。
When he knew that there was a problem with the evacuation programme, he chose absolute obedience and eventually brought himself to the chen oblast of yongcheng and to the kodlin war criminal management centre。
The logic of history tends to be close to the nuance。
The young lieutenant-in-chief, who was in the gubei junction in 1933, and the deputy commander-in-chief of chiang kai-shek, who was in the command in 1948, who was sorely in his face, was actually a mirror of the same soul in different times。
Throughout his life, he had sought that medal, which represented the highest honour, but had never been able to grasp the evolution of a real strategy。
In the game of violence of the old age, he was disciplined, understanding the manners and sufferings, but only lacked the courage to reframe the rules of the game in a subversive manner at a critical time。
If we look at this from the deeper logic of the system, we can see that doo-ming's defeat is in fact a fair echo of the national government's military reward and punishment system。
In the age of the faction, where the interests were exchanged, chiang was able to resist the invisible pressure of such a right-wing big man, and to topple this misbehaving general on the medal list. Apart from this, it is self-evident how uniform the internal evaluation was after the war in the ancient north。
That was not just a military failure, but a kind of downgrading of his potential as a commander。
Looking back from 1933 to 2026, it is not difficult to see that the tragedy of doo-min was not due to his lack of effort, but rather to his constant attempts to confront a modern war that had evolved in its paradigm with an old, rigid defensive mind。
He was pushed to the decision-making position as a top implementer, and then, at every crossroads, he chose the safest and, indeed, most dangerous direction。
The missing medal became the earliest and most heavy footnote in his career。
