Japan's economic and social reforms have been gradually deepening since the mid-1980s, when the cabinet of the former prime minister followed the trend of times and promoted the privatization of state-owned railways. In the mid-1990s, hashimoto's cabinet launched a reform programme covering six major areas, aimed at reshaping japan's economic and social fabric, leading the country into a period of unprecedented change, a period that has been described by the late generations as a “peace into statehood”. However, in this series of waves of reforms, the reform of the postal system has not been put on the political agenda and has become a “deep corner” that cannot be ignored in the reform process in japan。
In 2001, junichiro koizumi took the throne of the prime minister under the banner of reform and quickly promoted reform of the postal industry. Subsequently, a bill establishing the post office was adopted and officially launched in 2003。
After the 2004 senate elections, junichiro koizumi re-organised the cabinet, appointing takesuke hirsuke as the main head of postal reform. It then proposed a framework for postal reform, on the basis of which a reform programme to break down the postal society into four separate entities was developed. Under this programme, the postal service will be reorganized into a fully-owned government holding company, while the postal service will be divided into 100 per cent government holding of “mail service companies” and “window network companies”. The postal savings sector will be transformed into a “post savings bank”, the simple insurance sector into a “post insurance corporation” and a privatization process is planned for 2007。
It is noteworthy that this reform programme has been heavily affected by the german postal reform. Since the implementation of the privatization reform of the german postal system in 1995, four of its major business developments have provided japan with an example of reform, while putting considerable pressure on japan. Despite this, japan still appears to be lagging behind in the area of postal services, which to some extent slows the pace of overall reform in japan and affects the international competitiveness of the industries involved。
Following the senate's veto of the postal privatization bill, leaders of major business alliances, such as the japan economic community and friends of the economy, expressed deep concern, reflecting the business community's concern about the delay in postal reform. The president of the central bank of japan, fukui junhiko, stated categorically that the rejection of the postal privatization bill would have a negative impact on deepening financial reform and enhancing the effectiveness of financial policies. It is perhaps these considerations that led koizumi to decide to dissolve the house, to seek popular support for postal privatization through a referendum and to raise awareness of the urgency of the delay in reform。
However, against the backdrop of the democratic party's opportunity to wage a war on power, koizumi had to compromise. Not only did he give up the reform of the post office before the senate and senate voted, but also, following the dissolution of the house, he intended to give up privatization in the field of postal finance. It is clear that even if a new postal reform bill could be passed by a special congress, the nature of its programme has fundamentally changed. At that time, it was doubtful whether japanese postal privatization would truly achieve global competitive effects。
It is clear that koizumi's reform was not intended to enhance the overall competitiveness of japanese postal services, but was driven more by political objectives. As early as 1992 when koizumi was minister of post, he proposed the idea of reforming the postal service. However, this idea was rejected not only by the partido democratistas, but also by the internal isolation of the post department at the time. He then spent almost every day in the minister's office listening to classical music alone. It may still be hard to forget that marginalized period of politics. Indeed, as the japanese media put it, koizumi's real purpose was to witness the replacement of the tablet of the “japan postal service” with the “japan postal holding company”. The specific content of this privatization seems to go beyond his political considerations。
The famous japanese businessman changhiko aoki stated that one of the core issues facing japan was the decision-making structure of public policy. This structure is designed to give priority to the protection of vested interests, leading to lifelong employment being taken for granted, thus creating interest groups that protect existing organizations and hinder new entrants. These groups, in collusion with the bureaucracy, seek refuge in the administrative decision-making process. For their part, “ethnic parliamentarians” (parliamentaries representing the interests of industry groups) act as intermediaries for industry groups, leading to “general agreement, opposition to specific issues” and making it extremely difficult to break any vested interests。
In this context, junichiro koizumi presented the draft privatization and submitted it to the japanese senate and house of representatives for consideration. However, the bill was eventually rejected due to a joint boycott by some members of the opposition, including the democratic party in the senate, and the partido democrática. In order to promote reform, junichiro koizumi even offered to dissolve the house of representatives。
Following the re-election of the house of representatives, the partido democrático democrática (sdl) won an unprecedented victory in the elections and a privatization bill was passed. On 1 october 2007, the japanese postal service successfully implemented privatization。
On 24 march 2010, the government of japan published a new proposal amending the total privatization of postal services with the aim of retaining some control over the postal financial system. This programme was presented at a press conference by jianxiang tokui, minister for post and financial affairs. According to torui, the government will hold more than one third of the shares of the japanese postal company, thereby granting the government the right of veto on matters of importance to the holding company. The japanese postal company will hold more than one third of the shares in postal savings banks and insurance companies。
Although the new programme retains the future listing plans of holding companies, savings banks and insurance companies, it differs significantly from the postal privatization programme in koizumi. Koizumi had expected the postal financial sector to be completely free of government control by 2017. However, in the new programme, the government will consolidate holding companies, post offices and japanese mails for mail delivery, while savings banks and insurance companies will become subsidiaries of integrated enterprises。
In addition, the personal deposit limits of the postal savings bank and the scope of liability for postal insurance have been adjusted. The new programme raised the ceiling from 10 million yen and 13 million yen to 20 million yen and 25 million yen, respectively。
In introducing the programme, tokui emphasized that their goal was to ensure that japanese postal companies provided efficient and universal services throughout the country. This new proposal undoubtedly poses a major challenge to the postal reform programme promoted by former prime minister junichiro koizumi。
