In order to follow up on the important statements and directives of the general secretary of xi jinping on the responsibility for safe production, the civil aviation authority organized, from march to august 2025, an inquest on the subject of strict implementation of the responsibility for safe production, with a view to enhancing the integrity and effective implementation of the responsibility for safe production in civil aviation. A special section of the paper is devoted to the publication of excellent articles from this essay for readers。
Responsibility for safe production is the cornerstone of the safe management of civil aviation and its effective implementation is directly related to the continued stability of aviation security. In recent years, the “four pillars” of responsibility for the safe production of civil aviation have been largely established as the relevant legal and regulatory framework has evolved. However, at the practical level, the full-fledged and effective functioning of accountability remains a challenge. The precise identification of these difficult points, closures and the search for systemic solutions are key topics for improving the effectiveness of civil aviation security management and moving towards higher levels of security。
In-depth analysis of the real dilemma of safe production accountability landing
Based on practical observations, accountability ranges from “paper” to “ground” in four main categories。
(i) definition of responsibilities `verbalization': lack of interfaces and chain faults
Vertically transmitted decay: the problem of “hot, medium temperature, lower cold” continues to be prominent in the process of transfer of safety responsibilities from the decision-making to the operating layer. There is a gap between high-level attention and awareness among front-line staff, and some staff are not sufficiently aware of the critical importance of their responsibilities。
Barriers to horizontal synergy: there is a blurring of the interface of responsibilities between sectors and between business blocks, and the “triple imperatives” principle is difficult to fully clarify in specific matters. Particularly in new business, cross-business or unforeseeable event disposal, there is a risk of accountability or poor collaboration。
The system is detached from reality: some of the lists of responsibilities are not fully operational, and there is a problem of copying regulations or “general sizes”, which does not take fully into account the specificities and complexities of different jobs, different operating environments (e. G., high plateaus), resulting in less operational liability clauses。
(ii) fulfilment of `surface layering': knowledge of disconnections and capacity deficits
“knowing” is not “daunting”: employees, while aware of the content of their responsibilities, lack a deep fear of the value of life, the political significance and the legal weight that lie behind them, and fail to truly internalize security responsibilities into behavioural habits and professional conduct, with more passive responsibility than active responsibility。
`capability' does not match: the professional skills, emergency response capacity, risk management capacity of some of the posts are inadequate and, despite a sense of responsibility, lack the technical support and capacity security needed to effectively discharge their responsibilities, resulting in “dependency”。
“fine” is weak: the priority of safety responsibilities may be compromised in specific decision-making and operations, influenced by factors such as operational efficiency, cost pressures and traditional practices. Staff members are concerned that reporting problems or disruptions can lead to inconvenience or even accountability, thus choosing between silence and irregularity。
(iii) “formalization” of the responsibilities appraisal: calibration of indicators and
Results-based, light processes: excessive reliance on delayed outcome indicators such as accidents, accident detection, and insufficient attention to process indicators such as day-to-day risk management, safety inputs, system improvements, safety culture-building, etc., to scientifically measure the effectiveness of day-to-day implementation of accountability。
The single and rigidity of the appraisal process: it is often not sufficiently linked to pay-for-performance, promotion development, and the “one-vote” system of safe production is difficult to enforce in practice, leading to a diminished deterrence and orientation of the appraisal process。
Weak data support: lack of capacity to conduct objective, real-time, data-based evaluations of the performance of responsibilities using big data, information-based tools, reliance on regular inspections, desk accounts, and lack of comprehensive and accurate factual information。
(iv) “simplified” accountability: different scales and missing positive incentives
(a) broadening or softening accountability: there is an extreme tendency to “account for accountability” or “do what you want”. Either accountability expands and discourages staff motivation; or accountability is not in place, it is too broad and soft, weakening the seriousness of the system。
The culture of impartiality is not strong: the distinction between unconscious errors, spontaneous reporting of security information and intentional violations, concealment of non-reporting, and failure to effectively create a non-punitive reporting environment for “negligence towards people” affects the willingness of employees to proactively expose problems and take responsibility for improvement。
Inadequate incentives are being provided: good collective and individual performance of security responsibilities, lack of sufficiently strong and timely honour incentives and material rewards, failure to fully motivate the entire workforce and increased reliance on external constraints for accountability。
Path selection for building a "accountability, accountability, accountability" closed loop system
In order to solve these difficulties, it is necessary to maintain a systemic mindset, to work together on a number of dimensions, including systems, implementation, culture and technology, and to construct clear, closed, efficient and accountable ecosystems。
(i) accurate “accountability” for a breakthrough in detail, quantification and personalization
Dynamic optimized list of responsibilities: periodic review of the system of responsibilities based on the concept of sms (security management system). Using methods such as job security analysis, macro-responsibility is graded into each post, each chain, ensuring that the terms of responsibility are specific, measurable and operational, in particular by fine-tuning the interface between special operations and cross-cutting responsibilities。
Strengthened contract management: increase the sense of ritualism and seriousness of responsibility through the signing of the act on the responsibility for safe working, the act on the commitment to safety at work, and the list of posts, etc., to ensure that every employee is impressed with his or her commitment to safety。
Strengthening advocacy for follow-up and interpretation: through case teaching, scenario simulations and other methods, the content of the responsibility is read in depth, explaining “why” and “how” and “the consequences of failure” to ensure that responsibility requires thinking。
(ii) enabling “accountability”, building the foundations of strength, access and culture
Enhanced capacity-building: increased investment in training for differentiated, operational skills training and retraining for different jobs, especially emergency response, risk identification and training in the application of new technologies, and enhanced professional competence in effective performance。
Clear access to security information: promote and optimize the whistleblower system, establish a security information reporting system that is accessible, confidential, non-punishable (for unintentional violations and spontaneous reporting), encourage staff to proactively report risks and create a safe environment for fulfilling their “reporting responsibility”。
Deepening the building of a culture of safety: the continuous development of a culture of civil aviation safety centred on the “first of life, first of safety, duty of observance and seriousness”, making the implementation of responsibility a value and conscious action for all through leadership, role models and thematic activities。
(iii) scientific “compelling” in process, data and rigidity
Optimization of the system of performance indicators: a comprehensive security performance assessment system combining leading indicators (e. G., number of risk reports, completion rate of training, acceptance rate of security recommendations, etc.) and delayed indicators is in place, with greater emphasis on the evaluation of security management processes。
(a) to conduct job examinations for job responsibilities, taking into account differences in posts, and to uphold the principle of grade evaluation: in developing the performance appraisal programme, account should be taken of the share of responsibility for safe work in each job and the percentage of responsibility in each job. The responsibility examination functions are classified into categories a, b, c and d, which are to be matched with the job characteristics and the degree of relevance to the work of safe production. For example, 65 per cent of category a posts (e. G., security management posts) are considered for responsibility, 50 per cent for category b posts (e. G., production and operation posts), 35 per cent for category c posts (e. G., management support posts) and 20 per cent for category d posts (e. G., other posts)。
Enhanced technical empowerment: use of information tools such as qar (quick access recorder), oa (automated office) back-office capture, security management system, to achieve objective data collection and analysis of key performance processes and to provide accurate and impartial data support for appraisal。
Scrutinizing the application of results: strictly linking the results of the security appraisal to individual performance, pay, promotion, merit, etc., and implementing the “one-vote” system of safe production, effectively performing the function of the “command stick” of the appraisal。
(iv) normative “accountability”, with precision, impartiality and orientation
Consistent with the rule of law, precise accountability: clear and transparent accountability procedures and standards of handling. A strict distinction is made between intentional violations and unintentional errors, “zero tolerance” for non-reporting, false statements, intentional violations, etc., and, in cases of voluntary reporting, timely disposal and avoidance of consequences, the duty to mitigate or exonerate employees and protect their motivation to perform their duties in accordance with the law。
(b) deepening the culture of justice: creating an “incompetent” investigation climate and improving the focus system rather than simply holding individuals accountable. Accountability is used as an opportunity to learn from experience, improve systems and upgrade systems, not as an end point。
Integration with the security performance appraisal: the deductions from the sector's security performance appraisal are based on the principle of a hierarchy of accountability, whereby the persons to whom the scope of responsibility for the work is concerned are given weights based on their active reporting, subjective fault and weighting of the severity of the consequences。
Sound positive incentives: the creation of a dedicated security incentive fund that will provide significant awards to groups and individuals who make outstanding contributions in risk prevention and control, risk management, emergency response, and so forth, and who take their responsibilities seriously, setting positive markers and stimulating positive energy。
The landing of safe production responsibility is a long and complex system project that cannot be achieved overnight. Civil aviation employees must remain sober, face the issue, be guided by the important statement of secretary-general xi jinping on safe production, be guided by a sense of responsibility of “time and time” and continue to refine the lines of “accountability,” be more effective in terms of “accountability,” be scientifically accurate in terms of “accountability” and regulate “accountability”. Only in this way can we truly break down the challenges of the land, weave safety and productive responsibility nets and lay the strongest safety foundations for the development of high-quality civil aviation. (by zhao, unit: tibetan airlines)
