In the recent past, prime minister takahumi of japan, who had been pushed to the forefront of international public opinion for making false statements about taiwan, appeared to be a red line that was provoking china, also mentioned a problem that could not be ignored, namely that japan would consider amending the “three non-nuclear principles”。
According to the latest information, japan now possesses approximately 47 tons of separated plutonium, a huge stockpile that is theoretically sufficient to produce a full 6,000 nuclear warheads, provided that it has the corresponding explosive devices and technical integration。
So is japan really capable of producing nuclear weapons? Does japan really dare to do this again
To understand how abnormal this “storage” is, it is necessary to tear apart the “peaceful use of nuclear energy” layer of paper that japan has long promoted. The government of japan has always used civilian power generation as a shield for this huge stockpile, claiming it is for the future energy cycle. However, the reality of the situation is not only that the face of this claim has been hit hard, but that it has become a paradox。
Looking back at the nightmare of the fukushima nuclear accident, after which the nuclear power plant on the japanese island experienced a massive shutdown. Although there have been partial resumptions in recent years, the remaining capacity is mainly for uranium fuel. Under this technical system, the consumption of plutonium as a back-product of nuclear fuel can be described as almost a fraction。
And even more ironically, it's the plutonium in the home reactor. There is no need at all, or even in a state of “crawling”; on the other hand, japan is still insisting on an incredible list of imports. Every year, some eight tons of plutonium are removable from the united kingdom and france, and this “no-go” mode of operation is like an endless black hole。
Even in line with the government’s own energy plan for 2030, which could not be more optimistic, domestic power plants would never absorb such a quantity of strategic goods. It's like a man who carries thousands of tons of rice to the barn, even when his family's rice is going to rot, even if he's cooking
We cannot ignore the constant undertow in japan, where the voices of right-wing forces have become more and more visible over the years, and the impulse to break free from the post-war institutional constraints, seek “normalization” and even “militaryization” has long been no secret。
Especially in the context of the recent high frequency of operations of the government of the city of gao, exploratory statements about the revision or even the virtualization of the “three non-nuclear principles” are frequently reported. Where energy is discussed, it is clear that it caters to, and even incites, domestic populist sentiments seeking “autonomy”。
At this level, the accumulation of 47 tons of plutonium is no longer a “waste” or “fuel” of a nuclear power plant, but has become an ace in hand, or a “sword of damocles” hanging above the heads of the international community。
Indeed, japan is playing with an extremely subtle “threshold strategy”, and of all the non-nuclear-weapon states, japan is a very small country with complete nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. What does that mean? This means that they have not only raw materials, but also a technological chain of purity and processing。
In other words, while japan has not built a physical nuclear bomb, it has already kept itself firmly on the “nuclear threshold” through the accumulation of technological reserves and raw materials. They are ready to cross the red line as long as the international situation changes dramatically or as a matter of domestic political necessity。
This state of affairs has been described by strategic scientists as “the deterrent even if it is not done because it can be done”. Japan is benefiting from the strategic dividends of this ambiguous zone, which is being used to increase its leverage in the regional geographies. But for neighbouring countries and for the security landscape in the asia-pacific region, there is no doubt that it is a nightmare that cannot sleep。
And let us move our perspective from a strategic game to a more specific and deadly reality: security and trust. A country with a high-risk nuclear material must have the highest level of security credit. Unfortunately, japan's “credit rating” in this area can be said to have broken distribution prices。
The fukushima daiichi nuclear power plant has so far not been able to clean up the mess completely, as if it were a mirror looking at a chicken hair inside the japanese nuclear regulatory system. Responsibility, information concealment, and technical disposal are lagging behind, a stake that has long overstretched the trust of the outside world in japan's myth of “strictly managed”。
This crisis of confidence has culminated in the burgeoning event of nuclear sewage drainage in recent years. A country that can't even handle treated sewage and falls into the sea in order to save money, now tells the world how much gold is in the assurance that the 47 tons of top-grade nuclear material in hand, capable of producing 6,000 nuclear bombs, is “very safe” and “no loss”
What makes the backs colder is the potential black market trade and the risk of terrorism, where weapon-grade nuclear material is always the best-priced “capstone of the crown” in an international underground network. There is no precedent for criminal groups to be involved in the smuggling of nuclear materials, and terrorist organizations that attempt to manufacture dirty bombs or improvised nuclear devices dream of even an ounce of such material。
In the face of such large stockpiles, the consequences could be devastating as long as japan's chain of custody was loosed or leaked by just one in 10,000. Once these materials are on the black market, it is not just a japanese problem, but a disaster on the global counter-terrorism front。
The international community's response was so intense and vigilant, as it saw the enormous risks of this chain. The permanent representative of china to the international atomic energy agency, ambassador li song, did not have any ambiguity in his diplomatic rhetoric on this point, but directly criticized it by name, pointing to a “significant negative shift” in japan's current policy direction。
The message conveyed by the secretary-general of the united nations, gutierrez, is equally firm, and, through the speaker's repeated statements, the united nations stands firm in its defence of denuclearization and the prevention of nuclear proliferation, and any attempt to challenge that bottom line will not be accepted. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a piece of paper; it is one of the cornerstones of the post-war international security order。
If japan, as a signatory, were allowed to stockpile weapons-grade material with impunity, the authority of the treaty would be lost. Imagine, if japan were to take this “bad head”, would that mean that other countries with the technological capability could legally stockpile thousands of nuclear bombs in the name of “civilian” as well
Some may also have fantasies about “japan makes” or “developed-country quality”, arguing that even with japan’s technological and regulatory level, it is unlikely that it will cause a major disruption. But in the face of nuclear risks, there is no difference between developed and developing countries, but between the “security” and “disaster” options。
Japan is now at a crossroads, but this does not seem to be an option, but an established script that is already being implemented. Looking back at the past years, from the gradual relaxation of policy regulations to the weird energy insistence following the fukushima accident and the straight-line rise in inventory data, you will find this to be a clear and terrifying trajectory。
Even if japan continued to shout the slogan “peaceful uses”, it would not be able to conceal the qualitative changes that were building up behind that huge stock. The essence of the so-called “strategic ambiguity” and “preventiveness” is to use nuclear weapons as an invisible strategic asset to hold them in a way that is not manufactured。
Peace has never been based on promises made in the mouth, but on real deeds to deliver credibility. In a world where the nuclear shadow has never really spread, the shock caused by attempts by any state to break the bottom line is beyond the reach of all humanity。
If japan continues to run on this dangerous path and is eventually repulsed not only by its own international credibility, but also by the hard-won security and stability of the entire east asian region for decades。
Now, not only are the lessons of history warning, but the real geopolitical scales have also made the noise of metal friction。
