But even the philosophy of practice is a manifestation of historical contradictions, and indeed of those — because it is the most conscious, and therefore the most complete — which means that it is linked to “necessarily” rather than to “freedom” that does not exist today and that does not exist in history. Thus, if it is proved that contradictions will disappear, then it is implicit that the philosophy of practice will disappear or will be replaced. In the kingdom of “freedom”, ideas and ideas no longer emerge from contradictory territories and from the necessity of struggle. Now, the philosopher — the practical philosopher — can only make such a general assertion, not go further; he cannot flee the existing land of contradiction and, if it does not directly create a utopia, he cannot assert, except in general terms, that there is no contradiction。
This is not to say that utopia cannot be of philosophical value, because it has political value, and that every politics implies a philosophy, even if it is unsystematic and in embryonic form. In this sense, religion is the largest utopia and the largest “form to school” known to date in history, as it is the most ambitious attempt to reconcile the contradictions of reality in historical life in the form of myths. Indeed, it asserted that human beings have the same “nature” and that there are ordinary people who believe that human beings are created by god, that they are the sons of god, that they are brothers of others, that they are equal to others, that they are free among others and that they are like others; and that he can see himself as a “self-conscious” of humanity in the mirror of god; but religion asserted that all this is not in this world, but in another (utopia) world. In this way, the concepts of equality, fraternity and freedom are inspired among people, in those segments of humanity that do not see themselves as equals, nor as brothers of others, nor as frees like others. It is for this reason that, in every radical commotion of the masses, these demands are always raised in such a way as to take special forms and special ideologies。
Here we can insert a comment made by irich lenin. In the april 1917 article on general schools, more precisely, the explanatory note to this article (see geneva version of 1918) refers to the chemist and educator decapitated during the horrors of jacobin. Lavazi and his age, the masses of the population, came together to present the concept of ordinary schools, not just an ideology used as an instrument of domination, and thus to draw concrete conclusions on the equality of all. It is also a utopian element — a factor that is more or less apparent in all the cultural thoughts of the supposed “innate” monologue of human beings; and it has a convincing theoretical significance of a political principle in irich。
If the philosophy of practice is theoretically asserted that every “truth” believed to be eternal and absolute has its roots and represents a “temporal” value (the historic nature of every world and view of life), it is still difficult for people to understand “in practice” that such an interpretation is also valid for the philosophy of practice itself, and that such an interpretation does not shake the faith that it is necessary for action. Moreover, this is a challenge for every historical philosophy; poor debaters (especially catholics) take advantage of this difficulty to confront one “scientist” and one “seditor” of the same person, to confront philosophers and activists and to infer that historicalism inevitably leads to moral corruption and degradation. This difficulty produces a great many musicals of conscience with small figures, and the “olympia” attitude with big figures. That is why it is necessary to analyse and refine precisely and carefully the propositions of the transition from the inevitable to the free kingdom。
As a result, even practice philosophy tends to become ideology in the worst sense, i. E. A dogmatic system of eternal, absolute truth. This is particularly true in the common manual, which confuses the philosophy of practice with that of materialism, which is necessarily a permanent and absolute “material” form。
It is also worth noting that the transition from necessity to freedom occurs through human society, not through nature (although it has an impact on our intuition of nature, our opinion of science, etc.). It can be asserted that, although in a unified world the philosophy of practice may disappear, many of the mind-minded concepts, or at least some aspects of them, that remain elusive during the course of the inevitable kingdom, can become “truth” after transition. When a society is divided into groups, when one speaks of “spirit”, one necessarily concludes that it is the “group spirit”! This fact was acknowledged when people, as gintire did in his book on modernism, followed by boonhua to say that religion is the philosophy of the masses, and that philosophy is the religion of the chosen people, the religion of the great intellectuals. However, once harmonization had taken place, it would be possible to speak in those terms。
Economics and ideology
This proposition, which was presented as the main assumption of historical materialism — that every political and ideological fluctuation can be expressed and interpreted as a direct manifestation of structure, that it should be refuted in theory as a primitive childhood disease, and that in practice it should be criticized with the true testimony of marx, the author of specific political and historical writings. From this point of view, the napoleon iii coup d ' état and the works on the question of the east are of particular importance and include, of course, other works (revolution and counterrevolution in germany, civil war in france and some shorter ones). An analysis of these works will make it possible to better construct the methodological theory of marxism's history, to synthesize, explain and interpret the theoretical assertions scattered throughout his work。
It follows from this that in his specific studies, marx took genuine preventive measures, which could not have their place in his general writings. Among these preventive measures, the following are examples:
(1) the difficulty of establishing structures at any given time (like a snapshot image). In fact, at any given moment, politics is a reflection of the underlying development trends, but they are not necessarily realized. Specific research and analysis of the structure can only be carried out once the entire development process of the structure has been completed, while only hypothetical studies can be undertaken during the development process and deal with assumptions as clear conditions。
(2) it follows from this that a particular political act may be a computational error on the part of the ruling class leaders. This error has to be corrected and surpassed by historical developments, through the “crisis” of the parliament and the government that guided the class. But mechanical historical materialism does not allow for the possibility of error. It considers that every political action is directly determined by the foundation and represents a real and lasting (in the sense of being achieved) change in the foundation. The principle of “mistake” is a complex one: one may involve an impulse of individuals based on miscalculation or a unsuccessful attempt by a particular group or faction to direct the leadership within the group。
(3) it is not enough simply to remember that many political actions are carried out because of internal needs with organizational characteristics. In other words, these actions are linked to the need for coherence among a party, a group and a society. The history of the catholic church, for example, is clear. If we are going to find a direct original explanation for every ideological struggle within the church, it is too careless: it is for that reason that all kinds of political-economic fiction have emerged. On the contrary, most of these disputes are linked to sectarian and organizational needs. In the controversy between rome and byzantine over the origins of the holy spirit, it would be absurd to look for a basis for a belief that the holy spirit is only a claim from the father and a basis for a belief that the holy spirit is a claim from both the father and the son to western europe. The existence and conflict of the two churches, which depend on the foundation and history as a whole, raise the issue of the difference between the two and the principle of unanimity within each party, but it may happen that the claims of either of the two churches may in fact be what the other party claims. The principles of division and conflict would be exactly the same, and it was the issue of division and conflict that constituted the historical problem, not the flag that was occasionally raised by that party or that party。
The authors of the ideological series published in the magazine " labour issues " (he must have been the notorious ferance weiss), in a funny myth entitled " russia's dumping policy and its historical significance " , were talking about these debates in the early christian era. He claims that these arguments are linked to the material conditions of that time, and if we do not succeed in identifying this direct link, it is either because these facts are far from us or because of some other intellectual weakness. That is a convenient statement, but of no scientific value. Indeed, each of the historical stages of reality leaves a mark on the subsequent stages, which in a sense constitute the best archives to prove its existence. The process of historical development is one of time-bound unity, through which the whole of the past is now encompassed, while the “essential” part of the past is now realized — and there is no remnant of what “indistinguishable” as “in essence”. And the missing part, that is, something that has not been irrefutablely inherited in the course of history, has no meaning in itself. It's an occasional and occasional “scum”, a chronicle of history, not history. In the final analysis, it is a superficial, forgotten episode。
X. Ethical science and historical materialism
From my point of view, the ethical scientific basis of historical materialism is to be found in the assertion that “society will never give itself the task of resolving their problems before they are ripe”. Where these conditions exist, “mission resolution becomes `responsibility' and `will' becomes `freedom'”. In this way, morality becomes a condition necessary for the freedom of will, in a sense, to achieve a certain purpose, and a study to prove their existence. It's not about hierarchies for all purposes, it's about the level of purpose to be achieved. – it is assumed that what people want to “moralize” is not held individually by each individual, but by the society as a whole of individuals。
Regularity and necessity
How did the founders of practical philosophy acquire the concepts of regularity and necessity in historical development? I think that rather than viewing it as being derived from the natural sciences, it is a study and appreciation of concepts arising in the field of political economics, particularly the form and methodology derived from the economic sciences obtained from david ricardo. The concept and fact of the market decided: the scientific discovery of the historical creation of the permanence of special and decisive forces, whose role is in some form of “automaticity” - this automaticity allows for a quantitative “foreseeability” and certainty — manifested in the future of individuals who accept these forces after identifying and scientifically confirming their essence. Thus, the “decided market” is equivalent to “a specific relationship of social forces in the particular structure of the production institution”, which is guaranteed by a certain political, moral and legal hierarchy (i. E., perpetuating it). After defining the characteristics of these decisive and eternal forces and their automaticity (i. E. Their relative independence from individual choice and arbitrary government intervention), scientists use assumptions to make this automaticity absolute; he separates the purely economic facts from the conglomerate of the importance of the changes that these facts show in reality; he defines the relationship between causes and results, premises and conclusions; thus he presents a certain abstract image of the economic society (in this realistic and specific scientific construct, he then adds a new, more general abstraction of the “humans” themselves, as well as of “historics” and epidemiology, which is seen as true economic science)。
Assuming that these are the conditions under which classical economics can emerge, in order to talk about a new concept of new science or economic science (which is one thing), it is necessary to prove that new power relations, new conditions, new premises have been established, in other words, that a new market with new “automaticity” and its phenomena has been “decided” and that “automaticity” has been expressed as something “objective” in comparison to the automaticity of natural phenomena. Classical economics gives rise to “political-economic criticism”, but, in my view, it is not yet a new concept that could give rise to a new science or a scientific problem. The “criticism” of political economics proceeds from the historical character of the “decided market” and its concept of “automaticity”, while purely economists see these elements as “permanent” and “natural”; it analyses in a realistic way the power relationships that determine the market, analyses in depth their contradictions, estimates the possibility of changes linked to the emergence of new elements and strengthens them, and suggests the “temporal” and “replaceability” of this science, which is criticized; it also studies this science as life, finds in its heart elements that are bound to break it down, replace it, and proposes “successors” who must clearly demonstrate (e. G.)。
In modern economic life, the “arbitrary” element, whether at the individual, consortium or national level, acquired unprecedented importance and deeply disrupted traditional automaticity; however, this fact is not in itself sufficient to justify the concept of new scientific issues, since these interventions are arbitrary, variable and unpredictable. What it can prove is the assertion that there is a “crisis” because economic life has changed, which is self-evident. Moreover, it does not claim that the old “automaticity” has disappeared; it merely asserts that automaticity manifests itself to a greater extent than before at the level of major economic phenomena, while the loss of control is an isolated fact。
