The study [in brief on the articles] should be placed in the broader context of institutional transformation, in terms of institutional risk, so that there is a need to study the institutional causes of the formation of non-performing loans. (vi) the impact of the economic cycle of commercial banks the reality is that our economic development has become cyclical and is experiencing shocks from various economic waves at home and abroad. The reality is that ... Our economic development has become cyclical and is being hit by economic waves at home and abroad. Economic cycle fluctuations and bank credit are reciprocal feedback processes; bank credit is an important means of ironing economic cycle fluctuations. Economic cycle fluctuations affect the strategic objectives of credit operations. (vii) legal reasons for non-performing loans by commercial banks; these provisions make it more difficult to recover interest on bank loans. After-tax repayments also put the repayment of loans under direct threat. Some enterprises, even in the name of tax payments, evaded repayment of bank loans; and the delay or relief in interest payments reduced the firm's sense of urgency and responsibility for interest repayments and provided an excuse for the enterprise to default on interest on bank loans or even on the principal of the loans. When enterprises are dissolved, separated, cancelled, declared bankrupt and a liquidation group is set up, there is no provision for banks to participate in our legal provisions, and it is easy to find that commercial bank loan claims are at a disadvantage. Every time a business is dissolved, separated, cancelled, declared bankrupt and a liquidation group is established, there is no provision for bank participation. Such a provision, which prevents banks from participating in liquidation or the division of business claims in the event of the dissolution, revocation, merger or bankruptcy of a business, places banks in an extremely passive position in the protection of loan claims and puts the repayment of bank loans at great risk. While the commercial banks law of the people's republic of china provides that borrowers are required to repay their loans on time and are liable for default if they do not do so, it does not specify what liability should be assumed and who is responsible for the execution and supervision of the borrower's liability. In addition, the opinion of the supreme people's court on the implementation of the law on the insolvency of enterprises of the people's republic of china makes it clear that banks may not withhold deposits and remittances from the debtor to repay loans. The deduction is invalid and the deduction should be returned. Thus, the law does not give banks the right to take back their loans by force, and they cannot take back loans that are already in crisis. The order in which the debts of the insolvent enterprise are discharged is specified in the law of the people's republic of china on civil procedure, the regulation of the people's republic of china on collectively owned enterprises, the law of the people's republic of china on the insolvency of enterprises, and the law of the people's republic of china on companies, and the order in which the debts of the insolvent enterprise are discharged is clearly defined. In general, the assets of the insolvent enterprise, after liquidation, after deduction of the fees set out above, have left few funds to repay the bank loan. Moreover, certain insolvent companies have used these order of settlement requirements to artificially overestimate previous costs and deliberately overspent bank debts. These provisions are an important legal source of non-performing bank loans. The law on secured loans does not provide for strict guarantees of the loan, as the law of the people's republic of china on guarantees provides that the mortgagee may not secure a claim beyond the value of the mortgage, and that after the mortgage, the property is more than the balance of the secured claim and may be re-mortgaged, but not more than the rest of the balance. This provision provides insufficient guarantees for mortgages. The security act also provides that the mortgage disappears as a result of the destruction of the collateral, that the specific rate of compensation for loss is sufficient, etc. This may result in bank losses due to loss of collateral. The amount of the mortgage is determined at the rate of the collateral value in order to reduce the loss of bank loans. (viii) institutional causes of non-performing loans from commercial banks in the transition economy however, the objective of government action is to diversify into government administrative intervention in the operation of banks, which has always led to the formation of non-performing loans. The government's intervention is the cause of the non-performing loans, and companies and state-owned banks are state-owned and ultimately responsible for the lack of clarity about property rights at all levels of government. The imbalance between “hard debt” and “soft assets” resulting from soft-lending by state enterprises and banking relations exacerbates the risks borne by financial institutions. The main features of the transition economy and its manifestations at the financial level the institutional causes of the transition from non-performing loans from commercial banks in the transition economy are reflected in the introduction of a market economy under the traditional planned economic system, thus creating the dual institutional structure that characterizes the country during the transition period. In the process of gradual reform, the different features of changes in the structure of the system tend to be easily internal to the structure of the system
