The context of the article " cultural hegemonic struggle: a necessary failure and a lingering battle for positions " begins with a central issue: why, in western europe at the beginning of the twentieth century, such as italy, france and so on, it was impossible to repeat the russian model of “movement war” of 1917, whereby a few revolutionaries quickly seized the centre of state power. Utsuko points out that the underlying cause lies in the differences in social structures. Russia, as a result of its capitalist modernization, which was not driven from the bottom up by popular forces, but by royal nobility, had led to the incomplete development of its citizens'society, lacking a solid foundation of a pluralistic, self-organized private economic and cultural network. This weak social structure made the lenin-style lightning war a success. However, in countries such as italy, civil society is extremely well developed and complex in structure, and cultural traditions, academic systems and social organizations are intertwined, creating a strong “uphill structure”. It is against this historical background that granci reflected deeply in prison, introducing the theory of “ground battle” and the struggle for “cultural hegemony”, trying to open a new path for left-wing movements on such a different battlefield. I. Position warfare: at the heart of the doctrine of grange, which competes for cultural leadership in a closed civil society, is that, in the face of a mature and complex civil society, the path of revolution must move from direct military conflict to a sustained, multidimensional “ground battle”. The goal of the war was not to destroy the state apparatus, but to gradually infiltrate and compete for cultural leadership within civil society. This means that left-wing forces must fight against bourgeois ideologies in every socially constituted unit, such as factories, schools, churches, courts and even all symbol systems such as art and literature, and replace them with left-wing cultural hegemony. This struggle is carried out not by intellectuals who are traditional, dependent on modern authority such as clans or religions, but by “organ intellectuals”. These modern intellectuals not only possess a high degree of theoretical and organizational competence, but more crucially, their “organism” is reflected in two ways: first, their ability to organize themselves into a community of ideologues; and secondly, their close association with real social movements, drawing nutrients and reflecting on the practice of struggle, so that their theories are rooted in the real world and able to respond flexibly to rapidly changing social conditions. Theorists, as members of the organic community of intellectuals, are tasked with developing new theories, organizational approaches and modes of action in the face of a civil society organized by the people themselves and organized in such a way that every cultural position, like a soldier fighting in a trench, is invincible. The philosophy of practice: the theory that cultural hegemony can tame material violence is premised, however, on the further analysis of the philosophy underlying the grainian theory and its inherent vulnerability. On its introspective level, granci’s practice of materialism has shown a monismist tendency, which implicitly presupposes that the triumph of cultural hegemony can reach and be transformed into political and material domination. This theoretical framework seems to suggest that the physical violence of the state apparatus, including military force, can be persuaded, tamed and even assimilated through intellectual rational organization and lasting cultural penetration. The idea of shorting the main object to “practical” is actually rooted in the italian reality of grant tsi — that under fascist rule, direct violent confrontation is impossible and that the struggle can only turn to the cultural sphere. Thus, rather than being a blueprint for a universal revolution, rather than a strategic response to a particular historical dilemma, this theory implies a critical leap in theory, namely, the natural transition of cultural influence to control over material force, which is in doubt. Iii. The pitfalls of the understanding theory: the alienation of the struggle for truth into cultural games and the transformation of intellectuals is at the level of the theory, and the theory of grange has positioned the ideological struggle as a race for truth, with the inherent logic that the more truth, the more right theory (i. E. Marxism), the more cultural dominance is gained. This assertion of confidence ignores a fundamental question: the intellectuals themselves are not mere advocates of truth; they are equally the product of social relations and material interests. It is not clear that this pattern of struggle is highly susceptible to exploitation by the bourgeois class, especially in the so-called era of peace. Gracie's theory will be emptied of its political inner core, completely “methodized” and turned into a cultural game technique. The intellectuals have learned to do this kind of dragon-killing, but they may instead use it as a “jump-wielding line” in order to gain personal capital in the cultural arena. This has had a fatal effect: people are constantly falling and changing on the road to cultural hegemony. Because this practice module is essentially a loose alliance, lacking strong organizational constraints, many participants easily abandon their initial emancipation goals once the situation changes or personal gain emerges. Grange's own tenacity is a special case, and all theorists cannot be expected to have the same loyalty and substance. Iv. The folly of purpose theory and the necessity of detour practice, from the point of view of purpose, can ultimately lead to a “false cultural victory” in granci, turning it into a self-comfort “drawing pie”. Left-wing intellectuals have made achievements in the field of culture and are enthralled in their radical gestures, while real class contradictions within countries have been skilfully transferred through the global capitalist system. For example, by exploiting the financial and market markets of post-colonial countries, the country's population had maintained relative superiority, thereby buying the proletariat and disabling it. This disassociates the cultural left-hand stance from the harsh economic reality. However, utsuko made a crucial dialectic here: while this practice is doomed to failure and is illusory in purpose, it is indispensable in the “recession” of the revolution. It was this kind of cultural battle that enabled it to preserve the “fire seed” of the revolution, to maintain a sense of presence and the possibility of communication in the civil society and to prepare for the future struggle, both spiritually and culturally, in the low valley between the climax of the two revolutions. It can even bring practical resources, such as earning money through cultural and artistic activities or gaining sympathy and support by maintaining a good public image and avoiding total isolation and extinction. This practice, like the left-wing cultural movement in china in the 1930s, maintained the necessary human and intellectual base for the subsequent revolution, despite the presence of speculators and traitors. Concluding remarks: in the final analysis of the battle stance, which is doomed to failure but indispensable, the undecided son reveals the central dialectic of the theory of the hegemonic nature of the granci culture: it is a model of struggle that is flawed on the foundations of philosophy, highly variable in practice and illusory in its ultimate purpose, and is itself “defeating”. At the same time, however, it is a necessary strategy to “sustain”, preserve power and sustain the seeds of thought at certain historical times, especially when revolutionary forces are in a vulnerable and disempowering phase. It cannot bring final victory, but it can create the conditions for future victory as a fragile but crucial bridge between the past and the climax of the future revolution。
